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A PASSION FOR FASHION: THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE
COMMISSION SHOULD “STEP UP” ITS ROLE IN THE
ENFORCEMENT OF DESIGN PATENTS
The usefulness of the International Trade Commission as a forum for fashion
design patents due to the confusion of United States Patent and Trademark
Office-based and federal court-based intellectual property protections, looking at
the Louboutin case as the guiding exemplar.

Nikki Rigl
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I.  

INTRODUCTION

“Cinderella is proof that a new pair of shoes can
change your life.”1 Similarly, recent fashion law cases are
	
  
	
  
Author unknown, “Cinderella is proof that a new pair of shoes can
change your life,” http://www.scrapbook.com/quotes/doc/27219.html
(last visited Dec. 22, 2015).
1
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proof that a new forum can change a fashion designer’s
intellectual property rights. One recent case, Christian
Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent, brought to light a very
important notion: there is a severe danger and disadvantage
to the realm of fashion design when one designer holds a
monopoly over a color, absent an acquired secondary
meaning.2 Although the Federal District Court regarded
Louboutin’s Chinese red shoe soles as “overly broad” and
likely not protectable, the appeals courts gave Louboutin
excessive intellectual property protection to its red-soled
design.3 While it is important for designers to safeguard
their new designs, thereby distinguishing their brand in
order to draw consumer attention and create new business,
intellectual property law, in general, must ensure that
creativity is not being stifled by the monopolization of the
creative works and styles of one designer.4 This dichotomy
has engendered much fluidity with respect to decisions of
fashion-related infringement cases.5
A part of this fluidity arises from the confusing and
interpretation-heavy, ambiguous standards necessary to
satisfy infringement. This confusion exists for all forms of
intellectual property, but most importantly for this case, for

	
  
	
  
Julie Zerbo, Louboutin v. YSL Is Officially Over, THE FASHION LAW (Dec.
28, 2012), http://www.thefashionlaw.com/archive/louboutin-v-ysl-isofficially-over?rq=louboutin.
3 Id. (citing Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves St. Laurent Am. Holdings,
Inc., 696 F.3d 206 (2012); Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves St. Laurent
Am., Inc. 778 F. Supp. 2d 445 (2011)).
4 See Darrell G. Mottley, The Tools for Protecting Fashion Law Clients, 2012
WL 167353 *1, *1 (2012).
5 Id.
2
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trademarks and patents.6 This note will explore the
unaccountable trademark standards relied upon in deciding
the Louboutin case and proposes, instead, how the Louboutin
case could have been better interpreted as a design patent
case.7 From there, the note will analyze how Louboutin’s
red-soled design might have prevailed as a design patent
under federal patent standards versus the standards of the
International Trade Commission (“ITC”).8 Such an analysis
will bring to light the fact that the ITC is the most
advantageous and suitable forum for this particular fashion
design litigation.9 The note will then analyze what protection
would have been afforded to Louboutin in a European
jurisdiction.10

	
  
	
  
See Justin Hughes, Cognitive and Aesthetic Functionality in Trademark Law,
36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1227 (2014); see also Marta Kowalczyk, Design Patent
Infringement: Post-Egyptian Goddess, 2010 U. ILL. J. OF L. TECH. & POL’Y
239 (2010).
7 See generally Hughes, supra note 6; see generally Kowalczyk, supra note 6;
see generally Mottley, supra note 4; see generally Debra D. Peterson, Seizing
Infringing Imports of Cinderella’s Slippers: How Egyptian Goddess Supports
U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Enforcement of Design Patents, 90 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 888 (2008); see generally Sarah Burstein,
Moving Beyond the Standard Criticisms of Design Patents, 17 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 305 (2013).
8 See generally Kowalczyk, supra note 6; see generally Robert E. Bugg, The
International Trade Commission and Changes to United States Patent Law, 76
BROOK L. REV. 1093 (2011); see generally Peterson, supra note 7.
9 See generally Mottley, supra note 4.
10 See generally Susanna Monseau, European Design Rights: A Model for the
Protection of all Designers From Piracy, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 27 (2011); Tiffany
Mahmood, Design Law in the United States as Compared to the European
Community Design System: What Do We Need to Fix, 24 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 555 (2014); see generally Sarah Burstein, supra note
7.
6
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CHRISTIAN LOUBOUTIN S.A. V. YVES SAINT LAURENT
AM. HOLDING, INC.

Christian Louboutin is best known for his use of a
contrasting, bright red coloration on the outsole of his
heels.11 In fact, the “‘flash of a red sole’ is today ‘instantly’
recognizable, to ‘those in the know,” as Louboutin’s
handiwork.”12 Contention recently arose when Yves Saint
Laurent began to conceptualize and market a line of
monochromatic pumps, including a red shoe, which
featured a red insole, heel, upper, and outsole.13 Despite
initial negotiations to try to avoid litigation, Louboutin
ultimately filed an action under the Lanham Act on April 7,
2011, claiming “(1) trademark infringement and
counterfeiting, (2) false designation of origin and unfair
competition, and (3) trademark dilution, as well as state
claims for (4) trademark infringement, (5) trademark
dilution, (6) and unfair competition, and unlawful deceptive
acts and practices.”14 Louboutin also tried to obtain a
preliminary injunction, which would prevent Yves Saint
Laurent from marketing any shoes bearing a similar red
outsole, or in any similar red shade, which might cause
confusion among consumers.15 The District Court held that,
with respect to the fashion industry, “single-color marks are
inherently ‘functional’ and that any such registered
	
  
	
  
Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent America Holdings, Inc., 696
F.3d 206, 213 (2012).
12 Id. (quoting Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent America, Inc.,
778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
11
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trademark would likely be held invalid.”16 “[T]rademark
law is not intended to ‘protect[] innovation by giving the
innovator a monopoly’ over a useful product feature”—
because fashion relies more on allure and appearance than
other utility industries, the district court was wary of setting
a precedent allowing single-color trademarks because this
might ultimately hinder competition and creativity among
designers.17
On appeal, Louboutin’s red soles were held to be
protectable under the theory that the color was used in such
a way that Louboutin had acquired a secondary meaning,
thereby establishing the red soles as a distinctive symbol of
the Louboutin brand.18 Pursuant to the Lanham Act, “the
law provides the owner of a mark with the ‘enforceable right
to exclude others from using [the mark].’”19 However,
Louboutin’s protection was limited to just the contrasting
red sole, and accordingly, Yves Saint Laurent was legally
permitted to use the red sole on its monochromatic red
pump.20 As such, the appellate court affirmed the District
Court’s order permitting Yves Saint Laurent to use the red
lacquered outsole on its monochrome red shoe, but reversed
	
  
	
  
Id. at 214 (citing Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d. at 457); see also Qualitex Co.
v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162, 115 S. Ct. 1300, 131 L.Ed.2d.
248 (1995) (holding that color can be protected as a trademark only if it
“acts as a symbol that distinguishes a firm’s goods and identifies their
source, without serving any other significant function”).
17 Id. (quoting Fabrication Enters., Inc. v. Hygenic Corp., 64 F.3d 53, 59
n.4 (2nd Cir. 1995)); Kaitlin Powers, Saving Soles: The Limited Practical
Application of Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent America
Holding, Inc., 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 335, 361 (2013).
18 Id. at 225.
19 Id. at 216 (quoting La Societe Anonyme des Parfums le Galion v. Jean
Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d 1265, 1271 (2d Cir. 1974)).
20 Id. at 228.
16
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the District Court’s order denying trademark protection to
Louboutin’s contrasting red lacquered outsole.21
III.  

POSSIBLE PROTECTIONS FOR FASHION DESIGNS UNDER
UNITED STATES INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

As U.S. intellectual property laws have evolved,
uncertainty has arisen as to what basis must be relied upon
in order to protect intellectual property rights most
effectively and thoroughly.22 Two of the main sectors relied
upon by fashion designers are trademark law and patent
law.
A.   TRADEMARKS
Christian Louboutin relied upon trademark law for
protection in an effort to estop Yves Saint Laurent’s
marketing of what Louboutin deemed to be a confusingly
similar exploitation of his signature red-soled heels.23 While
Louboutin was granted a trademark for his red soles, that
trademark did not inhibit Yves Saint Laurent’s use of the red
soles on its monochromatic shoes—the product at issue.24
The ambiguity of trademark law standards likely
contributed to this somewhat inadequate win on
Louboutin’s part.

	
  
	
  
Id. at 229.
Peterson, supra note 7, at 892 (citing R. CARL MOY, 1 MOY’S WALKER ON
PATENTS §5:41 (4th ed. 2007)).
23 See generally Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 206.
24 See generally id.
21
22
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1.   CONFUSING STANDARDS IN TRADEMARK LAW
Currently, trademark law incorporates—and thereby
permits registration for—marks that are used in commerce,
which are inherently distinctive or have acquired
distinctiveness through the acquisition of secondary
meaning, so long as the mark is nonfunctional.25 Trademark
law application and precedent entertains a tendentious
reading of functionality.
a)   FUNCTIONALITY
The Lanham Act defines a trademark as “any word,
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, used
by a person to identify and distinguish his or her goods . . .
and to indicate the source of the goods . . . .”26 This definition
grants quite broad protection, especially in the realm of
fashion, because one designer can claim exclusive trademark
ownership over even the slightest detail, thus creating a
monopoly on a simple design that becomes an of-themoment trend; this is a major underlying reason for the
excessive prices certain brands are capable of charging their
customers.27 One limit that the Lanham Act imposes on this
seemingly overbroad definition is the functionality doctrine,
	
  
	
  
Rohini Roy, Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent: The Second Circuit’s
Functionality Faux Pas, 33 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 519, 540 (2014) (citing
Abercrombie and Fitch, Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9-11 (2d
Cir. 1976); Lanham Act §45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006)).
26 Id. at 520 (quoting Lanham Act §45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
27 Id. at 521. Louboutin’s red-colored soles are “capable of carrying
meaning” and the Lanham Act is broad enough to “include color within
the universe of things that can qualify as a trademark.” Id. (quoting
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prod. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995)).
25
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whereby product features that are “essential to the use or
purpose of the article” or “[affect] the cost or quality of the
article” are denied trademark protection.28 There are two
categories of functionality: utilitarian and aesthetic.29
Because the utilitarian functionality doctrine is aimed more
towards technical or mechanical functionality, aesthetic
functionality is a more relevant sector to analyze with
respect to fashion design.30
Aesthetic functionality
incorporates the basic tenets of utilitarian law, but the main
focus is more fact-specific and looks to the design’s impact
on competition.31
i.   AESTHETIC FUNCTIONALITY APPLICATION
When reviewing Louboutin’s trademark infringement
allegations against Yves Saint Laurent, the New York
Southern District Court (“District Court”) held that the red
color used by Louboutin on the soles of its shoes was
aesthetically functional and that no single designer had the
right to keep other designers from using such a critical and
desired hue on their footwear.32 Controversially, the Second
Circuit reversed the District Court’s ruling, instead
	
  
	
  
Id. (citing Lanham Act §§2(e)(5), 43 (a)(1)(3), 14(3) (2006); quoting
Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982)).
29 Roy, supra note 25, at 526 (citing Amy B. Cohen, Following the Direction
of TrafFix: Trade Dress Law and Functionality Revisited, 50 IDEA 593, 597
(2010)).
30 See Hughes, supra note 6, at 1247 (citing Mark A. Lemley & Mark P.
McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? Market Definition in
Antitrust and IP, 100 GEO L.L. 2055, 2063 (2012)).
31 Ashley E. Green, Red Touches Black: The First Application of Maker’s Mark
and Louboutin in the Context of Color Trademarks, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y. & L. 981, 987 (2014).
32 Roy, supra note 25, at 533 (citing Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 454).
28
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maintaining that Louboutin did in fact have a valid
trademark in the red sole of its heels because of the “pop”
engendered by the contrasting nature of the shoe’s colored
exterior and its ruby-red sole.33 However, the Second Circuit
failed to address the aesthetic functionality of Louboutin’s
red-soled shoes, generally concluding that not all single
color marks are aesthetically functional when within the
realm of the fashion industry.34 It relied on Louboutin’s
acquisition of secondary meaning for its red-soled heels (a
design aspect that, through advertising, media coverage, and
sale volume, created one of the “most revered shoes around
the globe”35) to solidify Louboutin’s enforceable trademark
and created a balancing test between “‘the competitive
benefits of protecting source-identifying aspects’ of a mark
[and] the ‘competitive costs of precluding competitors from
using the feature’” to overcome the need for a functionality
analysis of the red soles.36 The Second Circuit found that
	
  
	
  
Id. at 534 (citing Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 229; Scott Flaherty, How They
Won It: McCarter Saves Louboutin’s Soles, LAW360 (Oct. 23, 2012),
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/how-they-won-it-mccarter-savesloubouti-98617/; Benjamin Weiser, Shoe Designer Can Protect Its ‘Pop’ of
Red,
Court
Says,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
6,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/06/nyregion/court-ruleslouboutin-can-enforce-a-trademark-on-its-red-outsoles.html?_r=0).
34 Id. (citing Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 223).
35 Id. at 532 (quoting Danielle E. Gorman, Protecting Single color
Trademarks in Fashion After Louboutin, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 369,
370 (2012)).
36 Id. at 535 (citing Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 222-228); see also Ashley E.
Green, Red Touches Black: The First Application of Maker’s Mark and
Loubutin in the Context of Color Trademarks, 22 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y
& L. 981, 990 (2014) (citing Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 226 (describing the six
part test relied upon in Louboutin in determining whether a design
feature has secondary meaning: “(1) advertising expenses; (2) consumer
studies linking the purported mark to the source; (3) media coverage of
33
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giving Louboutin a trademark for its popping red soles
would not “significantly [undermine] competitors’ ability to
compete in the relevant market,” which was evident by the
fact that Yves Saint Laurent could still utilize red soles on its
monochromatic, non-popping heel design.37
“Sometimes color plays an important role . . . in making
a product more desirable.”38 This is the more traditional
functionality approach, which was relied upon by the
District Court in its conclusion that Louboutin’s red shoe
soles were aesthetically functional and, accordingly, were
not capable of trademark registration or protection.39 The
red lacquered soles of the Louboutin heels certainly appeal
to the aesthetic values of consumers, but “[a] design is
functional because of its aesthetic value only if it confers a
significant benefit that cannot practically be duplicated by the
use of alternative designs.”40 In the fashion industry
especially, it is important to navigate a balanced path
through the murky waters of innovative design protection
and healthy design competition—the murkiness of that
balance, and the disparate applications of the relevant
aspects of such a balance, is what has caused so much
controversy over whether a design feature is merely
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
	
  
	
  
the product; (4) sales success; (5) attempts at plagiarism; and (6) length of
time the mark has been used”)).
37 Hughes, supra note 6, at 1240 (citing Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves
Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 222 (2012)).
38 Id. at 1242 (citing Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165
(1995) (holding that “the right touch of beauty” given “to common and
necessary things” might “interfere with legitimate (nontrademarkrelated) competition through actual or potential exclusive use of an
important product [feature]”)).
39 See generally Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d.
40 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §17, cmt. c
(1995) (emphasis added)).
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aesthetically functional (and therefore not protectable) or
distinct, yet not sufficiently inhibiting of future potential
designs to qualify as aesthetically functional.41 This
imbalance seems to insinuate that trademark is perhaps not
the most suitable legal framework to rely upon in fashion
design infringement cases.
B.   DESIGN PATENTS
Patent law is a blossoming arena of intellectual
property protection that is acquiring more attention from
fashion designers.42 Design patents “serve to promote
decorative arts: ‘those arts which are made to serve a
practical purpose but are nevertheless prized for the quality
of their workmanship and the beauty of their appearance’”43
Designers who create any nonfunctional, “new, original, and
ornamental” design for an article of manufacture are eligible
to receive a design patent from the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO).44 Such an article of manufacture
is broadly construed to encompass “anything made by the
hands of a man from raw materials, whether literally by
hand or by machinery or art.”45 Given these
	
  
	
  
See generally Green, supra note 31, at 1005.
See Mottley, supra note 4, at 5.
43 Christina Phillips, The Real Cinderella Story: Protecting the Inherent
Artistry of the Glass Slipper Using Industrial Design, 48 VAL. U.L. REV. 1177,
1198 (2014).
44 Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 71 (2006)).
45 Id. at 1199 (citing Daniel H. Brean, Enough is Enough: Time to Eliminate
Design Patents and Rely on More Appropriate Copyright and Trademark
Protection for Product Designs, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 325, 336 (2008)
(quoting Application of Hruby, 373 F.2d 997, 1000 (C.C.P.A. 1967)
(quoting Riter-Conley Mfg. Co. v. Aiken, 203 F. 699, 703 (3d Cir. 1913))).
41
42
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characterizations, it seems as though Louboutin’s red-soled
shoes would meet the requirements for design patent
acquisition. Presently, Louboutin would be unable to acquire
a design patent given the statutory bar imposed by 35 U.S.C.
§102, which bars application for design patents after a year
from the public offering of the product. The following,
therefore, is essentially a thought experiment: Could
Louboutin have met the requisite standards for a design
patent, and would this form of intellectual property have
afforded a more effective and comprehensive protection?46
1.   CONFUSING STANDARDS IN PATENT LAW
In order to acquire patent protection, designs must
satisfy the general requirements of novelty and
nonobviousness, although there have been modifications to
both of these standards over time and there will likely be
future revisions to better identify and protect ornamental
features that the design patent enactment originally set out
to preserve.47 Functionality is an affirmative defense to
design patent registration.48

	
  
	
  
Doug Johnson, At The Intersection of Copyrights and Design Patents,
MILLER
&
MARTIN
PLLC,
https://www.millermartin.com/sites/default/files/documents/Copyri
ght%20&%20Design%20Patent%201%20pager%20v2.pdf (last visited
Feb. 28, 2016).
47 Burstein, supra note 7, at 309 (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2011)).
48 Margot E. Parmenter, Louboutins and Legal Loopholes: Aesthetic
Functionality and Fashion, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1039, 1079 n.249 (2013) (citing
Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 216-17).
46
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a)   NOVELTY
The point of novelty test was first set forth in Litton
Systems, Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp.49 The fundamental crux of this
test was whether the accused design appropriated the
novelty in the patented design.50 The point of novelty test,
however, was abolished recently in the case Egyptian Goddess
Inc. v. Swisa, Inc. in favor of the more pliable ordinary
observer standard addressed below.51 There, the point of
novelty test was deemed inadequate because: (1) it focused
on individual aspects of designs rather than the designs in
their entirety; (2) it was difficult to apply to more novel
designs; and (3) there was always ambiguity as to the extent
to which prior art elements constituted a point of novelty.52
As such, the ordinary observer test alone seemed to be a
better fit because it incorporated the important aspects of the
point of novelty test without as much confusion.

	
  
	
  
See generally 728 F.2d 1423, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 14850, 221 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 97 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
50 David A. Kalow and Milton Springut, Distinct Point-of-Novelty Test for
Design Patents Ends, 240 (No.86) N.Y. L. J. (Oct. 31, 2008),
http://springutlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/NYLJ_Distinct-of-Novelty-Test-For-Design-Patents-Ends.pdf.
51 Eva Szarenski, Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.: A Dramatic Change in
the Law of Design Patents?, 8 PIERCE L. REV. 89, 90 (2009) (citing Egyptian
Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 655, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding
that the point of novelty test no longer stood alone as a second and
freestanding requirement for proof of design patent infringement)).
52 Id. at 106-07 (citing Egyptian Goddess, Inc., 543 F.3d 655, 678 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
49
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i.   ORDINARY OBSERVER TEST
The “ordinary observer” test, now deemed sufficient
to guard against sweeping assertions of patent rights to an
extent that hurts innovation and competition, was set forth
in Gorham Co. v. White, where the court looked to whether
the patented design and the product at issue were so similar
that an ordinary observer would be motivated to purchase
the accused product under the assumption that it was the
patented design.53 Using the ordinary observer standard
ensures that the measurement of the relative value and
importance of the design feature is analyzed in the way that
the designers intended: through the eyes of an ordinary
consumer in a store.54 One alteration to the original ordinary
observer standard is that now, the test asks that the court
take into account the prior art, should the patented and
accused designs not appear plainly dissimilar on direct
comparison.55
With respect to the Louboutin case, the standard
would be whether observers of ordinary acuteness, “who are
the principal purchasers of the articles to which designs have
given novel appearances” (the buyers of red-soled
Louboutin heels), would be confused, misled, or induced to
purchase the other article (Yves Saint Laurent’s red-soled
monochromatic shoe) because the consumers mistakenly
assumed it was either the same article or was created by the
	
  
	
  
Mottley, supra note 4, at 7 (citing Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511
(1872)).
54 See Janice M. Mueller and Daniel Harris Brean, Overcoming the
“Impossible Issue” of Nonobviousness in Design Patents, 99 KY. L. J. 419, 472
(2010-2011).
55 See Szarenski, supra note 49, at 108 (citing Egyptian Goddess, Inc., 543
F.3d at 678).
53
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same designer.56 It would then be left up to the discretion of
the court to establish whether the red soles of both
Louboutin’s and Yves Saint Laurent’s heels would be so
substantially similar as to deceive an ordinary consumer,
giving the attention that a typical consumer would give in
the shoe-purchasing process.57
b)   NONOBVIOUSNESS
Nonobviousness is often regarded as a requirement
that, although somewhat reasonable when analyzing utility
patents, is unsuitable, subjective, impractical, and, some
argue, even impossible with respect to designs.58 Only time
will tell what alterations will be made to these design patent
standards to ultimately extend a more evolved and thorough
protection to designs.
In addition to being new, a patentable fashion design
“must meet the difficult requirement of nonobvious,” which
means that the “design must not be obvious to another
fashion designer [(one of ordinary skill who designs articles
of the type involved)] in light of all similar articles
previously created.”59 This standard is seemingly
	
  
	
  
See Gorham Co., 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1872).
Id.
58 Mueller and Brean, supra note 42, at 420.
59 Phillips, supra note 42, at 1199 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (“A
patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains.”); Thomas B. Lindgren, The Sanctity of the Design
Patent: Illusion or Reality? Twenty Years of Design Patent Litigation Since
Compco v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 10
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 195, 223 (1985) (“To resolve the question of
56
57
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unconquerable, especially given the communicative and
borrowing nature of the fashion industry: In order to
compete with domestic and foreign markets, fashion
designers are constantly adopting and adapting new trends
in order to stay afloat.60 Nonobviousness seems contrary to
the customary routines and strategies of the well-established
field of fashion design.
Further, when reviewing a design, one must consider
the design as a whole, rather than looking at the design
element-by-element.61 Essentially, the question at issue in
this regard is whether the qualitative aspects sought to be
combined are “so related that the appearance of certain
ornamental features in one would suggest the application of
those features in another.”62 The design must also be
“different enough from prior art to warrant a patent” (a
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
	
  
	
  
obviousness, the court must first view the prior art as disclosed by
previous patents and then, using expert testimony if needed, decide
whether the new design claimed represents more than the product of a
person ordinarily skilled in the trade, having knowledge of the prior
art.” (quoting Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100, 103 (Fed.
Cir. 1996)).
60 See Phillips, supra note 42, at 1218.
61 Dennis Crouch, Fleshing-Out Design Patent Infringement Doctrine,
PATENTLYO,
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2010/03/crocs-inc-v-usinternational-trade-commission-itc-fed-cir-2010-in-the-matter-of-certainfoam-footware-in-2006-t.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2015); but see Mottley,
supra note 4, at 5 (noting that, in design patent cases, ornamental features
or combinations of features can be separated out from the rest of a
fashion garment in drawings so that only the important design aspects
aspiring for protection are highlighted).
62 Jason J. Du Mont, A Non-Obvious Design: Reexamining the Origins of the
Design Patent Standard, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 531, 605 (quoting Application of
Glavas, 230 F.2d 447, 450 (C.C.P.A. 1956)).
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standard that is somewhat assessed within the novelty test
mentioned above).63
Louboutin uses the sole of heels, a known element, in
a novel manner by giving the sole a contrasting color pop
using a bright, candy-apple red coloration which stands in
stark contrast to the darkened or loud-patterned hue of the
outer shoe.64 Whether Louboutin’s design patent might
inhibit Yves Saint Laurent’s use of the red coloration on its
heel soles meets a similar burden as was faced by the
trademark analysis undergone in the case. Louboutin might
be able to assert that the red sole in general, and not just the
contrast of the sole to the outer coloration of the shoe, is a
part of its patent and that Yves Saint Laurent’s adoption of
the red sole in their monochromatic shoe is a simulation of
Louboutin’s signature embellishment, putting Yves Saint
Laurent in violation of Louboutin’s design patent.65
Conversely, Yves Saint Laurent could argue that the use of a
single color for the entirety of its heels serves a different and
distinct ornamental purpose, which stands apart from the
contrasting pop of the Louboutin heels. Granting a shoe
color monopoly to Louboutin because of a single ornamental
design innovation would be a disgrace to fashion designers
everywhere.66

	
  
	
  
Id. at 598 (citing In re Bartlett, 300 F.2d 942, 944 (C.C.P.A. 1962)).
See Phillips, supra note 42, at 1199 (citing Lindgren, supra note 57, at
224).
65 See Mottley, supra note 4, at 5 (“Design patents are essential tools in
protecting against clone and simulation-type products made by third
parties.”).
66 See Phillips, supra note 42, at 1227 (asserting that the inherent artistry
and creativity of high fashion deserves protection, and that the current
state of intellectual property protections are not adequate to provide that
63
64

2016

PASSION FOR FASHION

819

c)   FUNCTIONALITY
Design patent law, like trademark law, prohibits
protection for functional elements; however, ornamental
aspects not solely dictated by functionality are protected.67
Utilitarian aspects of design are not incorporated into the
design patent definition.68 In this regard, it is likely that the
trademark standard of utilitarian functionality, rather than
the trademark standard of aesthetic functionality, is the type
excluded from protection here. Functionality is not at issue
in the Louboutin case because the red-colored soles are
ornamental aspects of the shoe’s design. Although the sole of
the shoe is at issue, which is a functional aspect of the heel
design, the color—a decorative aspect—is the alleged
infringing content and, accordingly, functionality is not
present in this context.

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
	
  
	
  
sort of safeguarding, especially in the reproductive, competitive market
in which these fashion design creations lie).
67 Maggie Diamond, A Defense of Industrial Design Rights in the United
States, 5 N.Y.U. J. OF INTELL. PROP. & ENT. LAW 1, 13 (2015) (citing Rosco
Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., 304 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Graeme B.
Dinwoodie, The Protection of Designs Under U.S. Law, 4/2008 IPRINFO 1,
10 (2008); Orit Fischman Afori, The Role of the Non-functionality
Requirement in Design Law, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MED. & ENT. L.J.
847, 853-54 (2010)).
68 Id.
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INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION

A.   THE PURPOSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE
COMMISSION
The ITC was created in 1974 to govern international
trade laws, thereby promoting the United States as a
contender in the competitive global commercial
marketplace.69 Because the ITC is granted jurisdiction to
address import patent infringement and patent validity
disputes, it is essentially an alternative venue to federal
court for litigating patent disputes.70
The ITC is an appealing alternative to federal court
for complainants because it offers a faster resolution for
patent infringement claims.71 However, ITC litigation is
often accompanied by simultaneous litigation in federal
court because ITC proceedings only afford complainants
exclusion orders, while federal courts can provide

	
  
	
  
Bugg, supra note 8, at 1094 (citing About the USITC, U.S. INT’L TRADE
COMM’N, http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/about_usitc.htm (last
visited Dec. 29, 2015)).
70 Id. (citing Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional
Regulation of the ITC, 61 FLA. L. REV. 529, 544 (2009); Douglas P. Martin,
Preclusive Effect of Factual Determinations of the International Trade
Commission with Regard to Patent Matters, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 885-86 (1995)).
71 Joshua D. Furman, Reports of Section 337’s Death Have Been Greatly
Exaggerated: The ITC’s Importance in an Evolving Patent Enforcement
Environment, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 489, 491 (2015) (“Section 337
investigations are typically completed within eighteen months, while
federal court proceedings may take as long as several years.” (citing
PETER S. MENELL ET AL., SECTION 337 PATENT INVESTIGATION
MANAGEMENT GUIDE §1.4 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. eds., 2012)).
69
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complainants with monetary damages and injunctions.72 If a
complainant is more invested in stopping the importation of
allegedly infringing goods, rather than acquiring some form
of monetary compensation—which seemed to be the crux of
Louboutin’s desire in its confrontation with Yves Saint
Laurent—the ITC would likely be a better forum for
handling a design patent dispute. The ITC has the power to
order the U.S. Customs and Border Protection to exclude
imported products that infringe upon valid U.S. design
patents at the border, and it does so at a faster rate than that
typically accorded by the District Court.73
The ITC is “well equipped to handle patent and
trademark disputes and has the governmental power to
enforce the exclusions of infringing products into the US
from any source” within the global sphere, pursuant to a
Section 337 investigation.74 The ITC has in rem jurisdiction
over articles imported into the United States, and it can
	
  
	
  
Id. (citing Menell, supra note 1, at 1-24); see also Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n,
Recasting the U.S. International Trade Commission’s Role in the Patent
System, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2337, 2345 (2013) (citing Section 337
Investigations: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. INT’L TRADE
COMM’N,
PUB.
N O.
4105
1,
3
(2009),
http://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_property/documents/337_faqs.pdf;
19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (“Injunctive relief typically takes the form of an
exclusion order that bars importation of the infringing products and that
is enforced by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection.”)).
73 Mottley, supra note 4, at 7.
74 Id.; see also Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An Empirical
Analysis of Patent Cases at the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 63, 71 (2008) (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A)-(B); Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-418, §1342(a)(1)
(“Section 337 provides relief from unfair methods of competition and
unfair acts in the importation of articles into the United States, or in their
sale, if the effect or tendency of such actions is to destroy or substantially
injure a U.S. industry.”)).
72
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bring charges against an alleged infringer even when it lacks
personal jurisdiction.75 “A Section 337 investigation begins
with a complainant alleging that one or more parties’
‘imports . . . injure[s] a domestic industry or violate[s] U.S.
intellectual property rights.’”76 The domestic industry
requirement of Section 337 is satisfied by a two-prong
analysis: 1) the economic prong, which can be satisfied by
showing that the complainant has made a substantial
investment in domestic activities; and 2) the technical prong,
which can be satisfied by showing that the complainant has
a domestic product (usually established via evidence of
manufactured goods).77 A weak showing of one prong can
be bolstered by a stronger showing of the other prong.78

	
  
	
  
Bugg, supra note 8, at 1094.
Furman, supra note 69, at 489, 493 (citing Mission Statement, USITC,
http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/mission_statement.htm;
the
comparison chart in Menell, supra note 1, at §1.2.3 (making clear that,
unlike federal court proceedings, Section 337 investigations require a
showing of both patent infringement and a trade violation)); see also
Intellectual Property Infringement and Other Unfair Acts, USITC,
https://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_property.htm (last visited Dec. 20,
2015).
77 Id. at 494 (citing Wei Wang, Non-practicing Complainants at the ITC:
Domestic Industry or Not?, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 409, 414-16 (2012);
FAQs, INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION,
http://www.itctla.org/resources/faqs (last visited Dec. 21, 2015)).
78 Anders Fernstom, Exploiting the ITC’s Domestic Industry Requirement
Through Licensing, 41 AIPLA Q.J. 107, 116 (2013).
75
76
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B.   THE LOUBOUTIN CASE MEETS THE DOMESTIC INDUSTRY
REQUIREMENT, ASSUMING LOUBOUTIN TAKES THE
NECESSARY STEPS TO ACQUIRE A DESIGN PATENT
Past decisions indicate that trade dress—which we
can assume extends to trademark as well—and design
patent protection can co-exist when the “shape of the
product is ornamental and also serves to distinguish the
source of the goods and services.”79 These are distinct
protections that offer the owner of the intellectual property
different spectrums of security for varied amounts of time.80
In Louboutin’s case, acquiring a design patent for its redsoled heels would protect the non-functional, ornamental,
red-hued soles for fourteen years from intentional
substantial copying, while the trademark it establishes will
serve to protect the Louboutin brand from other brands’
products that might create a likelihood of confusion in the
eyes of consumers for as long as Louboutin uses the mark in
	
  
	
  
Julia Anne Matheson, Combine and Conquer: How the Synthesis of Design
Patent and Trade Dress Achieve Maximum Protection for your Product Design,
FINNEGAN
(2009),
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news
=74f843be-c63a-40cc-8ae0-007bc50fdd99 (last visited Feb. 14, 2016) (citing
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 7:91 (4th ed. 2008)); see also Robert S. Katz and Helen Hill
Minsker, Trademarks by Design: Combining Design Patents and Trademarks
to Protect Your Intellectual Property, NAT. L. J. (May 1, 2000),
http://bannerwitcoff.com/_docs/library/articles/bydesign.pdf
(referencing examples of well-known design trademarks that also have
design patents: DUSTBUSTER® vacuum cleaner, PEPSI®bottle, and the
HONEYWELL® round thermostat).
80 Id. (referencing In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 140 USPQ 575, 579
(C.C.P.A. 1964) (patent and trademark rights “exist independently of,
under different law and for different reasons”)).
79
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commerce.81 The following explains how Louboutin meets
the domestic industry requirement, should it desire to
extend the protection over its popping red-soled heels.
1.   LOUBOUTIN MEETS ECONOMIC PRONG
In order to satisfy the economic prong of the Section
337’s domestic industry requirement, Louboutin would need
to prove: “(A) significant investment in plant and equipment
relating to the domestic articles, (B) significant employment
of labor or capital relating to the domestic articles; or (C)
substantial investment in exploitation of the patent,
including engineering, research and development or
licensing.”82 To satisfy this prong, Louboutin would likely
rely on Option C, because it provides the greatest flexibility
to complainants: foreign entities that have principal
locations outside of the United States are not automatically
disqualified from meeting the economic prong based upon
their investments in the United States market.83 From a
fashion design perspective, research development and new
style-experimentation is done via fashion shows and
catwalks.84 These presentations highlight the in-vogue styles
	
  
	
  
See and compare id.
Charles Sanders, Domestic Industry Continued to Evolve at ITC in 2014,
Law360
(Jan.
8,
2015),
http://www.goodwinprocter.com/~/media/Files/Publications/Attorn
ey%20Articles/2015/Domestic%20Industry%20Continued%20To%20Ev
olve%20At%20ITC%20In%202014.pdf (citing 19 U.S.C. §1337(a)(3)).
83 See id.
84 See Susannah Frankel, The Big Question: What is the point of fashion
shows, and how do they influence the high street?, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 24,
2007),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/the-bigquestion-what-is-the-point-of-fashion-shows-and-how-do-theyinfluence-the-high-street-433529.html.
81
82
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of the coming season, inherently advertising and collecting
reactionary responses to the new trends worn by the
models.85 Christian Louboutin participates in several fashion
shows, putting its lacquered, red-soled heels on the models
at events like Paris Fashion Week, London Fashion Week,
and, most importantly, New York Fashion Week.86
Louboutin practices quality control by ensuring, even on its
globally-reaching website, that consumers are aware of so
called “Cheap Louboutin” or “Louboutin Outlet” shoes;
Louboutin demands, for the protection of its brand and its
consumers, that consumers buy via authorized retailers,
directed to through its website.87 Louboutin also houses a
search engine check on its website where consumers can
confirm that the search engine they plan on using to
purchase a pair of Louboutin’s signature heels is not actually
selling infringing products.88
Furthermore,
Louboutin’s
shoes
might
be
manufactured in Paris, but they are likely composed of
products imported from China, and are likely packaged and
somewhat retrofitted by the retail stores who carry
Louboutin’s red-soled heels in the United States, among
other countries who advertise and offer Louboutin’s shoe-

	
  
	
  
Id.
Christian Louboutin Adds Some Sole to New York Fashion Week,
LOUBOUTIN
(Sept.
23,
2015),
http://us.christianlouboutin.com/us_en/news/en_christian-louboutinadds-some-sole-to-nyfw-ss-2016.
87
Stopfake,
LOUBOUTIN,
http://us.christianlouboutin.com/us_en/stopfake (last visited Jan. 2,
2015).
88 Id.
85
86
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wear for sale.89 Taken together, these factors point toward
Louboutin’s satisfaction of the requisite factors under the
economic prong of the domestic industry requirement.90
2.   LOUBOUTIN MEETS TECHNICAL PRONG
Section 337’s technical prong analysis is the same as
that for patent infringements: “a complainant must show by
a preponderance of the evidence that an article practices one
or more claims of the patent at issue either literally or under
the doctrine of equivalents.”91 Simply put, Louboutin would
need to discern “domestic articles” that practice or exploit its
red-soled shoe design patent.92 Louboutin has nineteen
stores in the United States, which advertise, stock, and sell
the exclusive popping red-soled pumps: two in West
Hollywood, one in Santa Monica, one in San Francisco, five
in New York, two in Miami, three in Las Vegas, one in
Dallas, one in Costa Mesa, two in Chicago, and one in

	
  
	
  
See generally Thomas Stiebel, ITC Proceedings Offer Growing Market
Protections, in TOP LAWYERS ON TRENDS AND KEY STRATEGIES FOR THE
UPCOMING YEAR (2015).
90
See id. (“For example, research and development activities
characterized as pre-manufacturing, field engineering, testing, quality
control, repair, retro-fitting, and/or packaging have been sufficient to
constitute domestic industry in prior investigations.”).
91 S. Alex Lasher, The Evolution of the Domestic Industry Requirement in
Section 337 Investigations Before the United States International Trade
Commission, 18 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 157, 171 (2010) (citing Certain
Display Controllers and Products Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-481,
at 5253 (Feb. 2005) (citing Certain Doxorubicin and Preparations
Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-300, Initial Determination at 109 (May
1990)).
92 See Sanders, supra note 80.
89
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Atlanta.93 These nineteen stores necessitate domestic
investment and employment on Louboutin’s part and,
accordingly, Louboutin likely also meets the technical prong
requirements.94
V.  

SECTION 337 PROCEEDINGS

Because Louboutin appears to meet the domestic
industry requirement, the ITC would have proper
jurisdiction to carry forward a Section 337 proceeding,
whereby Louboutin could attempt to effectively exclude
Yves Saint Laurent’s allegedly infringing red-soled
monochromatic shoes from importation into the United
States.95 Section 337 “provides relief from unfair methods
and unfair acts in the importation of articles into the United
States, or in their sale, if the effect or tendency of such
actions is to destroy or substantially injure a U.S. industry.”96
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988
relaxed the requirement of proof of injury, mandating only
sufficient proof of injury via a finding of intellectual
property infringement.97 The overall decisional process
incorporates a determination on such proof of injury, along

	
  
	
  
Store
Locator,
LOUBOUTIN,
http://us.christianlouboutin.com/us_en/storelocator/northamerica/united-states (last visited Jan. 1, 2015).
94 Crouch, supra note 59 (fleshing out how a complainant can prove that
it practices its own patent in the domestic industry).
95 See Bugg, supra note 8, at 1098-99.
96 Chien, supra note 72 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A) (2007); 19 U.S.C. §
1337(a)(1)(B) et seq.).
97 Id. at 75-76.
93
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with a determination of the public policy implications of the
decision.98
On appeal, Louboutin’s popping, candy-red-soled
heels were deemed to be a part of its trademark (and, based
on the above analysis, Louboutin’s red soles would also
meet the requirements of a design patent).99 While the
District Court and the appellate court found no trademark
infringement on the part of Yves Saint Laurent, this does not
conclusively mean that the ITC would reach the same result.
This is especially true because of the public policy
implications that the administrative law judge, and,
subsequently the ITC, can integrate into its decisionmaking—the ITC’s administrative statute directs the forum
to consider the public interest when issuing a remedy.100
Fashion design is an area of innovation and creation that
might be examined differently by the ITC. Although
granting one fashion designer a monopoly over the color of a
shoe sole seems, at face value, like a major inhibition to other
creators in the fashion industry, allowing such a mark to be
unfairly usurped by another designer—essentially
advantaging another designer via the confusion of
consumers as to the true brand of the red-soled shoes
	
  
	
  
See Robert G. Krupka, Philip C. Swain, and Russell E. Levine, Section
337 And the GATT: The Problem or the Solution?, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 799
(1993).
99 See generally Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent America Holdings, Inc.,
696 F.3d 206 (2012).
100 See Krupka, Swain, & Levine, supra note 96, at 799; see also 19 U.S.C. §
1337(d)(1) (2006) (setting forth the policy consideration to be made by the
Commission of the effect on “competitive conditions in the US economy,
the production of like or directly competitive articles in the US, and US
consumers” when deciding whether articles should be excluded from
entry”); see also Colleen v. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, The
ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 19 (2012).
98
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advertised—violates the tenets by which intellectual
property law abides. Depending upon which policy
rationale sways the ITC, Louboutin might actually succeed
on its unfair trade infringement claim, and Yves Saint
Laurent’s monochromatic red heels would no longer be
allowed importation into the United States.
While I personally value creative expression and
think that trends in fashion often necessitate duplication or,
at the very least, inspiration in order for designers to
effectively compete in the market place, it seems unfair to
short-change individual creative innovations by permitting
their exploitation by other designers just for the sake of
economic competition and livelihood. Other forms of
protectable intellectual property, like music, screenplays, or
brand names, limit the use of certain note compilations,
story plots, and wordplays within catchy titles, yet these are
deemed deserving of protection. I fail to see how fashion
should be treated differently—a popping red-soled heel is
just as artistic and worthy of brand protection as a Nike
swoosh at the base of a pair of basketball shorts or a musical
sequence inherent in an original song.101
Even after the ITC finalizes a Section 337 violation,
the decision must then undergo presidential review.102 The
President can either approve the decision, or veto it based
	
  
	
  
See Nike Logo, FAMOUS LOGOS, http://famouslogos.net/nike-logo/
(last visited Feb. 12, 2016) (describing the design elements and history of
the Nike logo); see also Kory Grow, Robin Thicke, Pharrell Lose MultiMillion
Dollar
‘Blurred
Lines’
Lawsuit,
ROLLING
STONE,
http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/robin-thicke-and-pharrelllose-blurred-lines-lawsuit-20150310?page=2 (last visited Feb. 12, 2016)
(explaining the alleged infringement lawsuit between Marvin Gaye’s
“Got to Give it Up’ and Robin Thicke’s “Blurred Lines”).
102 Id.
101
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upon his or her own considerations of related policy and
practices and, especially, foreign policy violations.103 Cases
at the ITC are adjudged and decided on a case-by-case basis
and, accordingly, it would be merely speculative to
presuppose the ITC’s and the President’s overall settlement
of a case like the Louboutin case. However, it is possible that
Louboutin could have been granted relief more in line with
what it desired, had it brought its case to the ITC, because
this forum considers more than just a product-to-product
comparison and would prohibit future importation of Yves
Saint Laurent’s allegedly infringing shoes into the U.S.
VI.  

EU DESIGN RIGHT FRAMEWORK

The European Union’s (“EU”) two-tiered system of
legal design protection takes a more rational approach to the
safeguarding of fashion designs, recognizing that fashion
designers collaborate with and are influenced by other
designers as a common practice.104 Unlike the U.S., design
protection in the EU does not require a patent standard of
originality (like the U.S.’ novelty and nonobviousness
standards) and designs are not dissected into ornamental
and functional parts, which, under U.S. law, require separate
protections.105 Furthermore, the EU recognizes different
remedies for works of varied-inventive strength: there are

	
  
	
  
Id.
See generally Monseau, supra note 10, at 27; see also Erika Myers, Justice
in Fashion: Cheap Chic and the IP Equillibrium in the United Kingdom and the
United States, 37 AIPLA Q. J. 47, 58 (2009) (“copying occurs between all
layers of the fashion industry.”).
105 Id. at 57-58 (citing 35 U.S.C. §171, §101 (2006)); see also Phillips, supra
note 42, at 1198.
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stronger remedies for unique, original designs, and weaker
remedies for works that possess minimal inventiveness.106
The most notable and influential of the EU’s design
right statutes is the Design Regulation.107 Under this
regulation, designs are “automatically protected at the time
of their public release under the Unregistered Community
Design (“UCD”),” and this protection lasts for three years
from the date of public release in the EU.108 This innovative
strategy protects fashion designs from exploitation,
imitation, and other forgery for free for the allotted threeyear span before design protection registration is obtained.
The U.S. has no such easily-obtained, short-term protection
for inventive new designs in the high consumer demand
world of fashion, but it seems to be an intriguing aspect of
the EU law to implement in the U.S. intellectual property
realm. It is important to note, however, that the only
protection provided for UCDs is against designs that are
regarded as intentional copies—this coincides with the EU’s
overarching theme of wanting to promote creative design
and to uphold the customary dealings within the fashion
industry.109 It is possible that the strong intellectual property
protections already in place in the U.S. would not mesh well
with this somewhat lenient unregistered right shield.
Registered Community Designs (“RCDs”) are the
lesser-used tier of design protection in the EU.110 RCDs offer
25 years of protection from the date of filing and provide
protection for both intentional infringement, and even
	
  
	
  
Id. at 76.
Id. (referencing Council Regulation 6/2002, 2002 O.J. (L3) 1 (EC)
[hereinafter Design Regulation]).
108 Diamond, supra note 65, at 22.
109 See Monseau, supra note 10, at 27.
110 See id. at 60.
106
107

832

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

V. 23

infringement done in good faith.111 Facially, the RCD system
seems very similar to U.S. design patents. However, the
most important nuance to the EU Design Regulation is that
“designs are only prohibited where an informed user can
find virtually no difference between the design and an
earlier design”112 The EU’s “new” and “individual
character” standards are much more relaxed than the U.S.’s
nonobvious and novelty standards.113
A.   APPLYING EU DESIGN RIGHTS TO THE LOUBOUTIN CASE
The Louboutin case would have been resolved in a
manner more in line with the initial district court decision,
should the EU’s Design Regulation standards have been
applied to the case. The EU would likely have regarded
Louboutin’s claim of ownership over the red-hued sole of its
heels as unconvincing. Regardless of the innovation
incorporated into the design of the red-soled pumps, it
would be too restricting, especially in the domain of fashion
design, to give one designer ultimate control over a single
color. Furthermore, Yves Saint Laurent’s use of
monochromatic colors for the entirety of its heels, including
the sole of the shoe, would likely be interpreted in the EU as
a “new” design with “individual character,” distinct enough
from the overall impression of Louboutin’s contrasting
	
  
	
  
Diamond, supra note 65, at 22.
Monseau, supra note 10, at 59; see, e.g., Jimmy Choo Ltd. V.
Towerstone Ltd., EWHC (Ch) 346 (2008) (holding that the minor
differences between Towerstone’s bag and Jimmy Choo’s Ramona did
not influence the overall impression given by the bag and, because the
bag was seemingly identical to the Choo design, an informed user would
confusingly regard the two bags as coming from the same brand).
113 Id. at 58-59; but see Phillips, supra note 42, at 1198.
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colored-soled heels so as to not constitute intentional
copying.114
B.   LOUBOUTIN’S TRADEMARK WOULD LIKELY NOT HAVE
RECEIVED MORE PROTECTION IN EUROPE THAN WHAT
WAS GRANTED TO IT BY THE DISTRICT COURT IN THE
UNITED STATES . . . OR PERHAPS NOT ANY PROTECTION
AT ALL
Louboutin chose not to sue Yves Saint Laurent in
Europe, even under a trademark theory, and, based upon
precedential case law and future decisions made abroad, its
choice not to do so appears to be in its interest. Earlier cases
demonstrated that colors had to be portrayed in a
“systematic arrangement associating the colours concerned
in a predetermined and uniform way.”115 Accordingly,
Louboutin’s use of bright red coloration solely on the soles
of its designer heels, paired with the stark contrasting color
of the overall shoe color, might meet such standards to
suffice the acquisition of a trademark, but that trademark
would not extend to a monopoly over the color red, thus
barring Yves Saint Laurent’s use of red on the entirety of its
shoe, including the sole.116

	
  
	
  
Compare id.
See Taylor Piscionere, Imitation May Not Always Be The Sincerest Form of
Flattery: Why Color Wars in the United States and Europe May Result in
Brand Dilution and Color Depletion, 25 PACE INT’L L. REV. 43, 58 (2013)
(quoting Melissa E. Roth, Something Old, Something New, Something
Borrowed, Something Blue: A New Tradition in Nontraditional Trademark
Registration, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 457, 477 (2005) (citing Case C-49/02,
Heidelberger Bauchemie GmbH, 2004 E.C.R. I-06129 ¶35))).
116 Id.
114
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A more recent case in Europe—the Netherlands,
specifically—suggests that Louboutin may not have
intellectual property protection over its red soles at all. A
Belgian Court invalidated Louboutin’s registered trademark
because European law does not permit trademark
registration for “signs consisting of shapes that give
substantial value to goods.”117 The Benelux region has now
affirmatively set precedent that limits a single trademark
holder from acquiring exclusive control over a “technical,
functional, or aesthetic” product quality.118 Furthermore, the
judge made mention of the fact that red soles are more
commonplace in the fashion market than Louboutin alleges,
and that Louboutin’s red soles are not necessarily distinctive
enough to serve as a brand indicator.119 In this respect,
European intellectual property frameworks may further
limit the protection afforded to fashion brands, like
Louboutin, than the less-than-desired protection afforded by
the District Court in the U.S.
VII.  

CONCLUSION

Although utilizing the ITC for a case like Louboutin
runs slightly counter to the original intentions of the ITC, the
powers of the ITC have been so greatly expanded by the
loosening of the Section 337 domestic industry requirements
that a foreign company, like Louboutin, can more easily
	
  
	
  
Jeff Sistrunk, Belgian Court Invalidates Louboutin Red Sole Trademark,
LAW360
(2014),
http://www.law360.com/articles/523464/belgiancourt-invalidates-louboutin-red-sole-trademark (last visited Feb. 12,
2016) (referencing Christian Louboutin v. Van Dalen Footwear BV, AR
2013-6154 (2014)).
118 Id.
119 Id.
117
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bring suit to protect its national industry, albeit in a
previously
domestic-heavy
forum.120
While
the
determinations made by the ITC do not hold the same
finality and preclusive effect as determinations made in
district courts, the protections provided by the ITC do meet
the immediate needs of certain patent holders, like those that
Louboutin held in this case.121 Furthermore, even if a party is
technically allowed to bring a case previously resolved at the
ITC to a U.S. district court for subsequent litigation, these
actions are not always carried out due to the time, energy,
and expense required for dual litigation (especially if there is
a possibility of failure based on the litigation experience at
the ITC).122
Should Louboutin have acquired a design patent for
its popping red soles, which seems appropriate given the
nonfunctional and “new, original, [and] ornamental” design
of the stylized heel embellishment, then using the ITC as a
forum might have provided Louboutin with a more
favorable outcome, thus ousting Yves Saint Laurent’s red
sole lookalikes from importation into and competition
within the U.S.123 Other intellectual property protection
routes, including the European design right model, do not
seem to afford Louboutin the same hopes of desired,
comprehensive shielding from unfair competition and
deceptive imitation as does the ITC. Fashion designers like
Louboutin should think twice about which intellectual
	
  
	
  
See Bugg, supra note 8, at 1098-99.
See Krupka, Swain, and Levine, supra note 96, at 799.
122 Note that this does not preclude the ability of a party to bring an
infringement case to the ITC and district court simultaneously in hopes
of acquiring the different remedies provided at each forum: namely,
importation prohibition and monetary rewards, respectively.
123 Phillips, supra note 42, at 1198.
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protections to acquire for their products and, if necessary,
within which forum to employ those protections in the
unfortunate event of infringement or unfair competition.
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

